Haiti: Deadly confrontations between self-defense groups and gangs amid ongoing gang turf wars

In April, gangs increasingly came into direct confrontation with self-defense groups and unarmed civilians attempting to resist gang offensives. In Cabaret commune, Ouest department, the Titanyen gang, supported by members of the Base 5 Secondes and Canaan gangs, carried out several attacks in Source Matelas, with preliminary reports reporting the killing of at least 100 people. The gangs reportedly launched retaliatory attacks against civilians who have blocked roads since November 2022 to push back gang offensives.¹ Elsewhere, in the center of Port-au-Prince, local residents lynched 13 detained gang members that were being transferred by police forces following a clash in the Debussy neighborhood. Further violence was reported in the Ouest and Nippes departments throughout the month, leaving more than a dozen gang members dead. Since January 2023, gangs have increasingly responded to vigilante activity with retaliatory attacks targeting civilians, contributing to Haiti’s deteriorating security.²

Meanwhile, members of the Brooklyn gang – affiliated with the G-Pep gang alliance – clashed with the G-9-affiliated Belekou and Boston gangs in Cité Soleil, reportedly leaving 70 people dead. The clashes started on 14 April and lasted for over six consecutive days as part of rivalries between the two gang alliances over the control of Cité Soleil. The United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres reiterated a call for the deployment of an international armed force to address surging gang violence.³

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Honduras: Rival criminal groups clash inside prisons in three departments

On 8 April, clashes between incarcerated members of the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 (B-18) broke out in four detention centers located in El Paraiso, Francisco Morazán, and Santa Bárbara departments, leading to at least one fatality. Authorities claim that the gangs communicated with criminal cells operating outside the prisons in an attempt to destabilize national security.⁴ The incidents prompted President Xiomara Castro to launch an intervention plan, which includes new surveillance systems, the dismissals of corrupted prison guards, relocation of inmates affiliated with organized crime, and measures to reduce prison overcrowding.⁵ Despite the launching of this plan, clashes inside prisons continued throughout the month, driving heightened levels of prison riots and clashes, which thus far in 2023, have surpassed levels recorded in the whole of 2022. Criminal groups have controlled Honduras’ main detention centers amid weaknesses in the country’s penitentiary system, overcrowding, and the slow processing of criminal cases by judicial institutions.⁶ Jailed gang members are reported to communicate with members outside jails and participate in illegal activities such as extortion.⁷ 

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Colombia: The killing of social leaders continues amid ‘Total Peace’ negotiations

Despite the ‘Total Peace’ efforts proposed by President Gustavo Petro’s administration, armed groups continue to fight for control of illicit economies, especially in remote rural areas. In their competition over territorial control, armed groups reportedly killed at least 18 social leaders in April.⁸ Violence targeting social leaders increased notably in the Antioquia department, where the Gulf Clan has a significant foothold and with whom the government suspended ceasefire negotiations on 19 March.⁹ Colombian social leaders champion the rights of local communities and their access to public resources and lands. Due to their public role, they often fall victim to armed groups seeking to stifle dissent in rural areas.¹⁰ The government continued in its efforts to negotiate with armed groups. On 16 April, the Central General Staff Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia dissident group joined negotiations for an eventual demobilization of its factions.¹¹ Since President Petro took office, he has sought to mitigate armed conflict in the country through the ‘Total Peace’ process, which includes dialogues on ceasefire agreements between armed groups and the government.¹²

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Mexico: Environmental activists and members of Indigenous communities subject to persisting violence

Environmental activists continue to be the targets of violence in Mexico, with the killing of two activists recorded in April. Thus far in 2023, ACLED records at least seven events of violence targeting this group, which represents a twofold increase compared to the same period last year. Armed suspects kidnapped and killed an environmental activist of the Nahua Indigenous community in Chinicuila, Michoacán state. In this state, Indigenous communities have denounced irregularities in the granting of mining concessions by the government, as well as the presence of criminal groups involved in illegal mining activities.¹³ Meanwhile, in Oaxaca state, two gunmen killed an Indigenous activist from the Zapotec community who had opposed the construction of infrastructure projects such as the Tehuantepec Isthmus railways.¹⁴ According to local organizations, more than half of the aggressions targeting environmental defenders reported in Mexico in 2022 affected members of Indigenous communities.¹⁵ Similar attacks have occurred across Latin America and the Caribbean region. In April, ACLED records the killing of two Colombian activists who have advocated for animal rights and opposed extractive activities in rural areas in Antioquia and Norte de Santander departments.¹⁶ Thus far in 2023, ACLED records over a dozen targeted attacks against environmental defenders across the region.

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Guatemala: Unidentified suspects attack a mayoral candidate in Suchitepequez department ahead of the general elections

On 22 April, unidentified suspects ran over a mayoral candidate for the Nosotros political party while he was hanging a poster to promote his candidacy in San Pedro Cutzan, Suchitepequez. The victim denounced the incident as a targeted attack against him and called for investigations to identify the perpetrators and motivations behind the attack.¹⁷ The attack takes place ahead of Guatemala general elections scheduled on 25 June, which encompasses the election of the president, congress representatives, and municipal authorities, among others. It also follows the signing of the National Agreement on 11 April by 27 of the 30 political parties participating in the elections, who pledged to promote a violence-free campaign.¹⁸ Thus far in 2023, ACLED records at least two armed incidents targeting candidates, representing a decrease compared to the previous 2019 general elections, with at least six events recorded between January and April. Despite lower levels of violence, this year’s electoral cycle has been marked by tensions amid widespread demonstrations in February and March, sparked by the electoral court’s decision not to allow the registering of the Movement for the Liberation of the Peoples’ candidate.¹⁹

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Yemen: Violence drops to lowest wartime levels amid hopes for a renewed truce

Last month, political violence in Yemen dropped by 30% compared to the month prior, reaching the lowest level since the regionalization of the war in March 2015. This steep decrease coincided with a five-day Saudi and Omani delegation visit led by the Saudi Ambassador to Yemen to the capital city of Sanaa, amidst Oman-brokered peace negotiations between Houthi de facto authorities and Riyadh.¹ Although no deal was announced following the visit, signs of detente materialized in the following days with the second-largest exchange of detainees between the conflict parties.² Ongoing negotiations center on a reopening of Yemen’s ports and airports, the payment of civil servants salaries in Houthi-controlled areas, direct talks between the Houthis and the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG), and a two-year political transition.³ According to ACLED’s CAST predictions, the decline in violence associated with the peace negotiations is likely to continue in May 2023. Yemen spiraled into a civil war in 2014, when the Houthis ousted the IRG from Sanaa. The conflict was regionalized in March 2015 by the intervention of the Saudi-led coalition in support of the IRG.

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Iraq: Turkey targets Syrian Kurdish commander in Iraq amid increased airstrikes on PKK forces

In April, Turkey escalated its operations in northern Iraq targeting objectives linked with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Notably, on 7 April, suspected Turkish drone strikes targeted the convoy of Mazlum Abdi – a commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (QSD) considered by Turkish authorities a “terrorist” and a PKK leader.⁴ Abdi – a Washington ally in countering the Islamic State (IS) – was traveling with at least three US personnel near the Sulaymaniyya airport. The drone strikes resulted in no casualties,⁵ and came a few days after Turkey imposed a three-month flight ban on Sulaymaniyya’s airport because of suspected PKK infiltrations.⁶ The presidency of the Iraqi federal government condemned Ankara’s drone attack,⁷ while protests erupted in Erbil and Sulaymaniyya calling for the withdrawal of Turkish forces. The drone attack took place amid a 20% increase in Turkish airstrikes targeting the PKK in northern Iraq, following an upward trend that began in March 2023 after a lull in Turkish activity caused by the February earthquakes. Turkey and the PKK are engaged in a long-standing conflict over ethnic rights in southeastern Turkey and across the border in northern Iraq.

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Turkey: New trends in election-related violence

Political violence increased in Turkey in April by 30% compared to the month prior, driven by election-related events. New typologies of violence emerged ahead of upcoming elections, including the targeting of electoral offices and political candidates across Turkey. Unidentified gunmen carried out drive-by shootings targeting electoral offices belonging to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its main rival the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in Uskudar and Atasehir districts, resulting in no casualties. Meanwhile, rioters with unclear affiliations attacked election offices belonging to the CHP and the Green Left Party (Yesil Sol Parti) in Beyoglu and Efeler districts, while others physically assaulted members of the Iyi Party while handing out election brochures. Rioters also attacked the convoy of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s main rival for the presidency, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, while he campaigned in the southeastern city of Adiyaman. Turkey’s general elections will take place on 14 May, and voters will select a new president and 600 members of parliament. Ahead of the previous general elections, in June 2018, ACLED recorded a 90% increase of political violence compared to the month prior.

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Syria: Increased targeting of civilians amid surge in IS activity

IS engaged in heightened levels of attacks against civilians in April, continuing an upward trend that began in March. Compared to the monthly average for 2022, IS carried out twice as many attacks on civilians in April 2023. Most attacks targeted civilians searching for truffles in the Syrian desert.⁸ Since the start of the truffle season, which runs from February to April, ACLED records over 80 events targeting truffle hunters and more than 300 reported fatalities — including civilians and pro-regime fighters — mostly resulting from landmines or direct IS attacks. The number of fatalities during this season marks it as the deadliest since IS began attacking truffle hunters in 2019.⁹ The heightened levels of civilian targeting comes amidst a general surge of IS activity in Syria. In April 2023, ACLED also records a rise in IS attacks on pro-regime forces, pro-Iran militias, and QSD forces in Homs, al-Hasaka, al-Raqqa, and Aleppo provinces. Since the territorial defeat of IS in Syria in 2019, the remaining IS cells have largely engaged in ambushes, armed attacks, and explosions against regime and QSD forces, and civilians in the west Euphrates region and the Syrian desert.

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Palestine and Israel: Violence drops during the religious season despite incidents in East Jerusalem

April 2023 opened amid fears that the overlap of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, the Jewish holiday of Passover, and the Christian holiday of Easter could lead to an escalation of violence in Israel and Palestine.¹⁰ However, compared to March, levels of political violence only slightly increased in Israel, while they dropped by over 10% in Palestine despite a spate of Ramadan-related violence in East Jerusalem. As recorded in previous years, violence erupted following incidents around the al-Aqsa compound. On 5 April, Israeli forces raided the religious site injuring at least 12 unarmed worshippers and detaining 400 others. Due to the politico-religious significance of al-Aqsa, Arab ‘lone wolves’ responded to the raid with multiple forms of violence. On 7 April, a car-ramming attack killed an Italian tourist and injured seven others in Tel Aviv city. On the same day, a Palestinian gunman shot at a passing settler car in Nablus, killing a British-Israeli mother and her two daughters. Meanwhile, Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants fired rockets from the Gaza Strip towards Israel, with shelling also coming from Lebanon. Israeli forces retaliated by shelling Gaza, while raids continued in the West bank, resulting in over eight Palestinian rioters and militants killed.

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Sudan: Conflict breaks out between the SAF and RSF

Fighting erupted in Sudan on 15 April between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), aligned with the de facto ruler General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, popularly known as Hemedti. In the week following the outbreak of hostilities, political violence in Sudan reached levels over four times higher than the weekly average for the past year. Since fighting broke out, over 50% of battles were fought in Khartoum, with clashes outside the capital centered in urban areas along major roadways, especially east-west corridors from the state of Kassala to West Darfur. In the second week of fighting, battles between the RSF and SAF broke out for the first time in South Kordofan and West Kordofan states. Violence also escalated towards the end of the month in El Geneina, West Darfur state. Battles between the SAF and RSF have constituted 80% of all political violence events recorded in Sudan since 15 April and over 700 fatalities have been reported, with many civilians caught in the crossfire amid intense urban fighting (for more on the conflict in Sudan, see Fact Sheet: Conflict Surges in Sudan). The United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM) cited that the fighting has displaced over 300,000 individuals since 15 April, with more than 60,000 fleeing to neighboring countries.¹

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Ethiopia: Demonstrations break out in Amhara over federal government plans to re-absorb regional forces

On 6 April, the federal government announced a plan to reintegrate regional special forces into the Ethiopian National Defense Force, federal police, or state police, triggering demonstrations in the Amhara region. While Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed claims the integration will create stability, critics view the move as a way to shrink the power of individual regions.² Demonstrators opposed the plan due to deteriorating trust in the federal government and concerns over potential attacks.³ They also called for the release of detainees and the government to stop “the abuse against Amharas.”⁴ Demonstrations in Amhara reached their highest levels in over a year and contributed to a more than doubling of demonstrations across Ethiopia compared to the monthly average over the preceding year. The unrest in Amhara indicates the growing political divisions in Amhara between the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) and the Amhara PP and Oromia PP (for more details, see EPO Weekly: 26 March-1 April 2022). This discontent with the ruling PP has grown amid ongoing attacks against ethnic Amhara civilians in the Oromia region, frequent road closures, and the demolition of houses (for more details on the trends of violence against civilians in Oromia region, see EPO Monthly: June 2022; on the recent closure of roads, see EPO Weekly: 11-17 February 2023).

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Togo: A rare JNIM attack in Tone prefecture, amid an increasingly deadly Islamist insurgency

On 20 April, al-Qaeda-affiliated Jamaa Nusra al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) attacked civilians in the Tone prefecture, reportedly killing six people. The attack marks a rare incursion into Tone, which only accounts for 10% of political violence in Togo over the past year. Until now, political violence by JNIM has been concentrated in the Kpendjal prefecture, which accounts for nearly 70% of political violence in the past year. To date, 2023 has been particularly deadly. From January to April, ACLED records 74 reported fatalities, only four fatalities less than the total in 2022. JNIM operations in Togo began to increase in May 2022, when around 60 JNIM fighters attacked the Kpinkankandi military base in Kpendjal prefecture. While JNIM has been active in the littoral states for several years, JNIM expanded its operations into Benin and Togo in 2022, with violent events spiking in July. In a rare interview, President Faure Gnassingbé recognized this escalation of violence and claimed that around 40 soldiers and 100 civilians had been killed by Islamist armed groups in northern Togo.⁵

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Eswatini: Ongoing targeting of political party supporters

An armed group dressed in military uniforms, suspected to be military forces, attacked a former Swaziland Liberation Movement supporter in the vicinity of Mangwaneni after he attended a commemoration of the 12 April 1973 Decree banning political parties in Eswatini. The gunmen subjected the victim to physical abuse while questioning him about the location of political leaders and their firearms.⁶ On 12 April, to commemorate the ban, political activists submitted a petition at the United Nations office in Mbabane to urge intervention by the UN and persuade the government to end civilian targeting.⁷ Since the implementation of the 12 April 1973 Decree, political parties have been officially prohibited, and political gatherings require government approval.⁸ Violence escalated in 2022 and peaked in November following increased violence by a militant pro-democracy group called the Swaziland International Solidarity Forces, reprisals by state security forces, and violence carried out by unidentified armed groups. ACLED also records several civilian targeting events in the first quarter of 2023. Police and military forces are the most common aggressors in violence targeting civilians the preceding year, comprising nearly a third of civilian targeting events. After state security forces, the second most common violent actor includes unidentified armed groups, often with suspected links to political leaders or militant pro-democracy groups, and spontaneous rioters involved in mob violence, accounting for 25% and 29%, respectively.

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Chad: Cross-border violence from the Central African Republic

Last month, a Kodo militia – a Chadian armed group based in the Central African Republic (CAR) – crossed the border into the Monts de Lam department and attacked the civilians in the Danda area. The incursion by the Kodo militia initially targeted civilians, but led to clashes against local Fulani militiamen and the gendarmerie, resulting in over 20 reported fatalities. According to the governor of Monts de Lam, the Kodo militia crossed into Chad in order to instigate communal conflicts.⁹ The attack comes amid wider concerns about spillovers from the conflict in CAR. In February 2023, United States intelligence services warned Chadian authorities that the Wagner Group – the Russian private military company protecting the CAR government from rebel attacks – was attempting to destabilize the country by training militias near the CAR-Chad border.¹⁰ Several incidents of cross-border violence have occurred since October last year, when the Chadian military forces clashed with an unknown Chadian armed group, Wagner Group mercenaries, and CAR military forces in Lac Wey, Logone Occidental region.

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